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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROBATE COURT
IN AMERICA: II*

Lewis M. Simest and Paul E. Basye:j:

IV
COURT ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO CONTENTIOUS AND

N ONCONTENTIOUS BUSINESS
In any matured system of law the administration of a decedent's
estate may involve both contentious and noncontentious matters. Thus,
first, it is entirely possible that all interested parties are agreed that a
will is valid, or that there is no will and that the property should be
distributed to creditors and to devisees or heirs on some fair basis. Or,
second, there may be a dispute as to whether the will propounded is
valid; there may be adverse claims to the office of executor or administrator; a creditor's claim may be disputed by an executor or administrator; a dispute may arise as to priorities in the payment of legacies
when the estate is insufficient to satisfy all. As to this second type of
administrative matter, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it
involves the judicial determination of controversies of the same general
character as are handled by the civil side of a trial court of general
jurisdiction. It calls for the same capacity to supervise impartially the
trial of contested issues, the same ability to determine accurately the
application of complicated rules of law to the transmission of property
interests. In short, it would seem that the contentious business of the
court should be handled by a judge with as high qualifications as the
trial judge.
As to noncontentious matters, the situation may be different. Here
it is conceivable that the estate could be distributed without any judicial
intervention at all. Indeed, the Roman law system, with its conception
of universal succession,245 accomplished just that. And the modern
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tendency of legislation in the United States to dispense entirely with
administration in the case of small estates is to the same effect.246
Nevertheless, there are' many cases where· some judicial action is
desirable even though there are no controversies among the interested
parties. This becomes particularly important in view of the current
trend, elsewhere noted,247 to provide tl_iat the probate court distribute
land by its decree. In spite of the lack of disagreement among persons
interested in the estate, they may well need the aid of a court to
determine what is a just basis of distribution; they may wish to distribute in such a way as to avoid disputes in the future; and, to further
that end, they may desire to have an official record of the distribution
which has been made. Thus, the noncontentious business of the court
is an important function of the judicial organization. No statistics are
required to justify the observation that the vast majority of smaller
estates is handled by American probate courts without any controversies whatever. Administration in court is then desired solely for
the purpose of having the property of the decedent disposed of in an
orderly way.
As to the noncontentious business of the court, it is not so clear that
an efficient trial judge is needed. Certainly, by hypothesis, there are
no disputed issues to try. And much of the noncontentious business is
inere routine which can well be handled by a superior type of clerk or
probate register. Of course, insofar as the action of the court in nonco·ntentious business involves the avoiding of potential disputes, it
would seem to call for the same understanding of the intricacies of
property law as is necessary when there is an actual dispute.
It is the purpose of the discussion which follows to consider how
far the court organization in typical jurisdictions is adapted to a differentiation between contentious and noncontentious business. ·The
sharp differentiation in English law will first be pointed out. Then
the probate judicial organizations of various typical states will be considered in connection with the questions: How far have they retained
the distinction between contentious and noncontentious business emphasized in the English system which served as their model? How far
hay.e they developed a basis of differentiation unlike the English
model? The answer to these questions will involve some consideration
of the matter of will contests and of appeals by trial de nova in the
court of general jurisdiction. But it must be pointed out that the
246
247

See ATKINSON, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 529-540 (1937).
See Subdivision V of this monograph.
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handling of contentious and noncontentious business is under consideration here only as a matter of court organization and not as a matter
of probate procedure.
In the English ecclesiastical courts, the line between contentious
and nonc.ontentious business was pretty much the line between probate
in common and in solemn form, heretofore referred to. If a will were
probated in common form there was no notice to interested parties;
proof generally consisted merely in the executor taking oath that he
believed the instrument presented was duly executed by a competent
testator. If a caveat were filed by the next of kin, proof in solemn
form then had to be made; interested parties were cited; and the
attesting witnesses testified as to the execution of the will. The hearing
was before the ordinary. Contested issues as to the account of the
personal representative and as to a legatee's right to his legacy could
also be tried in the ecclesiastical courts. As to the real estate, noncontentious business would seem to have been handled without any judicial
assistance whatever; and contentious matters were dealt with either in
the courts of law or of equity, depending upon the nature of the
controversy.
Doubtless the distinction between the probate of a will in solemn
form and in common form was not developed primarily for the purpose
of judicial efficiency. One reason for it must have been the belief that
the decedent's estate required management from the moment of his
death; and that to wait for notice before the appointment of an executor
or administrator would result in a wasting of the property of the
decedent. This idea is voiced in the Report of the Com,,m,issioners
Appointed to Inquire into the Practice and Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts, which appeared in 1832.248 Concluding that the probate
in common form should be retained, the report states:
"For Probate so granted in common form, the only security
is the Oath of the Executor; and experience has proved that for
the immense majority of cases it is amply sufficient. A. very little
consideration will show that it would be absolutely impossible to
establish any a priori guards or cautions, which would not, from
the delay and expense, occasion an infinitely greater loss to the
Public, than may sometimes arise from what is called snatching
Probate of a paper, afterwards found not entitled thereto. Any
notice to Heirs-at-law, next of Kin, prior Devisees, or Legatees,
would be found utterly incompatible with the expedition and
248p_

37.
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economy, which are the most essential ingredients in the administration of every-day justice."
However, it must have seemed both inefficient and unduly expensive
to require citations to interested parties and proof by both attesting
witnesses before the ordinary in a case where there was no controversy
whatever as to the due execution of the will.
The present English probate organization distinguishes sharply
between contentious and noncontentious business; and it would seem
that this distinction bears a direct relation to the maintenance of efficiency in the court organization. Noncontentious business is defined
in th~ Supreme, Court of Judicature Consolidation Act of I 92 5,2'0 in
almost exactly the same terms as are used in the Court of Probate Act
.of-1857,250 as foll_ows:
"'Noncontentious. or common form probate business' means
the business of obtaining probate and administration where there
is no contention as to the right thereto, including the passing of
probates and administrations through the High Court in contentious cases where the contest has been terminated, and all business
of a non-contentious nature in matters of testacy and intestacy
not being proceedings in any action, and also the business of lodging caveats agai~st the grant of probate or administration."
The Principal Registry of Probate at London has jurisdiction of noncontentious business,251 and legislation also provides that grants may
be made in common form by district probate registrars. 252 Without
doubt the bulk of the probate business of England is handled as noncontentious business by probate registrars. Otherwise it would be quite
impossible for five judges to handle all the probate business for the
people of England. In the latest edition of Tristram and Coote's
Probate Practice this noncontentious procedure is described.258
· "The solicitor, in order to obtain a grant of representation to a
deceased person in the Principal Registry, must leave at the
Receiver's Department the 'papers to lead the grant,' viz. the
will and codicils ( if any) ; the oath; the bond ( if any) ; the Inland
Revenue affidavit, duly stamped, and such affidavits, renuncia15-16 qeo. 5, c. 49, § 175, p. u97 at 1286 (1925).
20-21 Viet., c. 77, p. 422 (1857).
251
15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 150 (1925).
252
15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 151 (1925).
258 T1t1sTRAM & CooTE's PROBATE PRACTICE, 18th ed., 14 (1940) •
249

250

•
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tions, certificates, etc., as may be necessary. The Receiver gives a
receipt for the papers •••
"In the Registry, the calendars are searched to ascertain that
no other grant has been made in respect of the same estate, the
papers are examined at the "Seats" Department, and, if approved,
a form of grant is prepared, and attached to a photographic copy
of the will and codicils ( if any). The grant is signed by the Registrar and sealed with the' seal of the Probate Division.
"On the production of the receipt given by the Receiver the
grant usually can be obtained at the Sealer's Department after
12:30 p.m. on the fourth day after the papers were lodged."
Contentious probate business is handled before one or more judges
of the High Court},! 64
In the United States the form of probate court organization in the
majority of jurisdictions appears to indicate some recognition of the
difference between contentious and noncontentious business; though
in others this differentiation has apparently been lost sight of. Thus,
as is indicated later, in a large group of states an appeal from the
decision of the probate court involves a trial de novo in the court of
general trial jurisdiction. In those jurisdictions the probate judge
ordinarily is not required to have as high qualifications as the trial
judge. Not infrequently he is not required to be a member of the bar
at all; his salary is, in practically all cases, less than that of the judge
of the trial court of general jurisdiction. In a general way it may be
said that noncontentious matters come before the probate judge and
that, in those matters in which the contest is more serious, the issues
are settled before the trial court of general jurisdiction. There is
nothing to prevent the probate judge from hearing contentious matters.
Indeed, ordinarily he must do so in the first instance. But, if a party
is sufficiently interested to appeal, he can have the issues tried anew
by the trial judge. In a considerable group of states there is more or
less of an attempt to retain the old distinction between probate in
common and in solemn form. That is to say, probate may be summary
and without notice; or it may be on notice to interested parties; and
the proceeding on notice may be either the original hearing or a subsequent hearing on the issue before the same court. In many states
provision is made for a proceeding known as a contest, which is a trial
of the issue on the due execution of the will. It has sometimes been
m 15-16 Geo. 5, c. 49, §§ 20, 55, 56 (1925); 18-19 Geo. 5, c. 26, § 6 (1928).
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said that the contest is similar to the old probate in solemn form. 25 G
However, in some states it 'would seem to resemble the device of
framing the issue devisavit vel non and sending it over to a court of
law to be tried. 256 Very commonly contest takes place in the trial court
of general jurisdiction. A brief consideration of the procedure in a
few typical states will 1llustrate the extent to which there is any differentiation of function with respect to contentious and noncontentiorubusiness.
Florida, although it has recently enacted a new probate code,257
is one of those jurisdictions which still retains something of the old
distinction between probate in common and in solemn form. Probate
is in the county judge's court.· No <;itation to interested parties before
probate is i:equired unless a caveat has been :filed by an heir or distributee. 258 Then the caveator must receive notice. When a will is
-admitted to probate, the personal representative or any other interested
person may take steps to have interested parties served with notice,
including notice by publication. A subsequent hearing in the judge's
court for revocation of probate ( which apparently takes the place of
the will contest or probate in solemn form found in some states) may
be had on the petitio11 of an interested party. The privilege of petition1ng for revocation of probate is limited to any heir or distributee of the
estate of a decedent except those who have. been served with citation
before probate or who are barred under section 732.29 ( the section
dealing with the case where an heir or distributee has :filed a caveat).259
In Georgia the procedure follows much more closely the English
ecclesiastical procedure.260 Probate may be either in common or in
~olemn form before the court of ordinary. The statutes also provide
for an appeal with trial de novo in the superior court, which is the
trial court of general jurisdiction.
In Missouri the original hearing for probate of the will may be
without notice,261. but there is no provision for contest in the probate
court. This takes place in the trial court of general jurisdiction and is
See Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558, 13 N. E. 166 (1887); Shaw v. Camp,
61 Ill. App. 68 (1895); Collier v. ldley's Exrs., (N.Y. 1849) 1 Brad£. Surr. 94.
256
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) tit. 20, § 1961.
257
Fla. Acts, ICJ3·3, c. 16103, p. 544•
258
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 732.23, 732.29.
259
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 732.30.
260
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §§ II3-601, II3-602, II3-605. As to appeals,
see §§ 6-201, 6-501.
26
l. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 529; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Gideon, 215
Mo. App •. 46, 237 S.W. 220 (1922).
255
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in the nature of an appeal with trial de novo.u 2 Unlike Florida, however, the Missouri statute permits any interested party to contest and
does not limit the right to contest to persons who were not served with
notice of the original application for probate in the probate court.263
Missouri is also one of those states which recognizes that an appeal
from a decision of the probate court involves a trial de nova of the
issues in the circuit court.264
In nearly half the states no grant of probate or administration,
other than the appointment of a special administrator, is possible without notice to interested parties unless such notice is waived. In some of
these there is a provision for contest after probate; in others there is
not. In Michigan, for example, there is no provision for contest after
probate, as such. But if interested parties file a contest before probate
in the probate court, the whole matter may be transferred to the circuit
court for hearing. 265 Moreover, provisions for appeal by trial de nova
in the circuit court 266 have the effect of a contest after appeal in the
trial court of general jurisdiction.
In California the trial court of general jurisdiction, namely the
superior court, is the court in which probate matters are heard. Moreover, appeals are not trials de nova but are heard by the same appellate
courts which hear appeals in civil cases. In spite of the fact that the
petition for probate or administration is always heard on notice to
interested parties,267 statutes provide for a contest after probate, which
takes place in the superior court sitting in probate.268 Contest after
probate is permitted by an interested person, "other than a party to a
contest before probate and other than a person who had actual notice
of such previous contest in time to have joined therein." 269 In California, since notice is required before probate and since the trial court
of general jurisdiction is the court handling probate matters, it would
seem that the provisions for contest after probate 8:re at variance with
any attempt to differentiate between contentious and noncontentious
business. Quite possibly contest after probate bears some slight resemblance to probate in solemn form. But if so, it merely means that
262
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. {Supp. 1943) § 538; Techenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209
Mo. 533, 108 S.W. 46 (1908).
263
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. {Supp. 1943) § 538.
264
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 291.
265
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (36).
266
Mich. Stat. Ann (1943) § 27.3178 (36).
267
Cal. Prob. Code {Deering, 1941) §§ 327, 441.
268
Cal. Prob. Code {Deering, 1941) § 380.
209
Cal. Prob. Code {Deering, 1941) § 380.
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there may be two hearings, instead of one, on the question of the due
execution of the will.
In at least two important jurisdictions, New York and Massachusetts, where proceedings for probate or administration are initiated on
notice to interested parties, there is, strictly speaking, neither contest
after probate nor trial de novo on appeal.2' 0 In New York, in order
to contest the will, objections must be filed in the surrogate's court at
or before the close of testimony for the proponent, or at such subsequent
time as the surrogate may direct. 211 But it is clear that this contest takes
place in the surrogate's court before the will is admitted to probate.
In Massachusetts, the' only contest is one arising in the probate court
before the will is admitted to probate.212 The probate judge, however,
has the power to send issues to the superior ~ourt to be tried there
- before a jury.273
To present an adequate account of the differentiation between
contentious and noncontentious business, something should be said with
reference to the function of clerks and registers of probate. This matter
is discussed at some length in subsequent paragraphs. At this point it
may be observed that, in most jurisdictions, the clerk or register has
no judicial powers. But, even if he does not, the clerical business of
the court may be so handled by 'him that the j{idge is enabled to
supervise a very large volume of judicial business. This obviously is
true in New York City, although the New York statutes do not give
the clerk of the surrogate ~ourt judicial powers.
By way of conclusioIJ- on the general question of the distinction
between contentious and noncontentious business, the following observations are presented for consideration: The common practice of
having a probate judge with inferior qualifications handle all probate
business in the first instance, with contest or trial de novo in the trial
, court of general jurisdiction, doubtless, in a rough way distinguishes
between contentious and noncontentious business. It is true, the pr9bate
judge hasjurisdiction over contentious as well as noncontentious busi210 Se~ 2 WARREN'S HEATON, SuRROGATEs' CouRTS, 6th ed., § 182 (1941);
NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF EsTATES AND FmucIARY LAw IN MASSACHUSETTS, 3d ed.,
§ 30 (1937).
'
271 N. Y. Surrogates' Court Act, § 147. It is true, however, that on an appeal
upon the facts, the appellate court has "the same power to decide the questions of fact
which the surrogate had" and may receive further testimony. See N. Y., Surrogates'
Court Act, § 309.
'
272 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 192, §§ 2-3. See also N~HALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND ,Fmuc1ARY LAw IN MASSACHUSE~, 3d ed., § 30 (1937).
278 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 16.
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ness. But if a party to the contentious business regards the .issue of
sufficient importance, he can, by the device of contest or appeal, have
it tried again in the trial court. However, it would seem that this is a
very inefficient way of distinguishing between contentious and noncontentious business. The probate judge, in spite of his lack of superior
qualifications, does try contentious matters in the first instance; and
when they are tried anew in the trial cpurt, the result is a wasteful
duplication of judicial effort. The prevalent doctrine that there should
be one trial and one appeal would seem to be applicable to issues in
probate courts as well as 'elsewhere. Where there is adequate notice for
the first hearing and a judge of sufficient ability, there would seem
to be little or no justification for a retrial of the issues in the probate or
any other court. Such is the result reached in New York and Massachusetts, where no contest after probate is provided for and a judge
who is sufficiently qualified to make a final decision on the issues sits
in the surrogate or probate court.
There are, however, strong arguments for an ex parte hearing
without notice, somewhat like the old probate in rnmmon form. This
prevents the expense and inconvenience of a special administratorship,
and probably results in less wasting of the estate immediately after the
death of the decedent. If such a hearing is permitted, it would be
possible, as in England, to have its routine handled by clerks or registrars. But the whole matter could well be under the direct supervision
of a judge of recognized competence. A further hearing on the issue
involved at such summary hearing should then be permitted before
the same court, but only on the petition of interested parti~ who were
not served with noti.ce or did not appear in the first hearing.

V
JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS OVER LAND

As has already been indicated,214 one of the most serious defects
in the English probate system of the period prior to the middle of
the ni~eteenth century was the great divergence in the treatment of
real and personal estate. The ecclesiastical courts had no jurisdiction
whatever over the decedent's land. They admitted wills of personalty
to probate; but wills of land were not probated there nor anywhere
else. The personal representative took title to personalty; the title
to land passed to the heir or devisee immediately on the death of the
decedent. But by English legislation previously described m the treat2

H_See subdivision I, supra.

275

60-61 Viet., c. 65 {1897).
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ment of land and personalty became practically uniform. A will of
land-is now probated just as a will of personalty. The jurisdiction of
the Probate Division over the administration of the decedent's land
was accomplished by the simple expedient of a statute which provides
that interests in land pass to the personal represen~ative just as chattels
had passed theretofore.
We are now ready to consider the question: To what extent have
American probate courts acquired jurisdiction over the lands of decedents? Certainly they have departed radically from the pattern of
the English ecclesiastical courts; yet it is- clear that the development
has not been like that of the modern English probate jurisdiction.
The subject of our inquiry is obviously significant as a matter of
procedure and due process. It is believed that the entire proceeding
to administer the estate of a deceased person is i unit and is a proceeding
in rem. If that be true, and if the probate court does in fact administer
the real estate of the decedent, then a reasonable notice to interested
parties at the time of the initial step in the administration proceeding
would suffice for hearing on all subsequent matters. 276 On the other
hand, if the probate court has no general jurisdiction over land, but
acquires it merely for the purpose of some particular step in the
proceeding, such as land sales or the collection of rents, then notice
to interested parties must be given at each such step.
Here, however, we are interested primarily in court organization
rather than in procedure or due process as such. But in that connection
also the question of jurisdiction over land is significant. It is commonly
assumed that inferior courts, such as justice courts and county courts,
are not to be entrusted with issues involving the determination of
titles to land. These matters are normally placed in the hands of the
trial judges or of others equally well qualified. If, then, the probate
court has jurisdiction of the land of the decedent, that is a strong
argument for a highly qualified judge in the judicial organization.
It is believed that in every jurisdiction in this country the probate
court has some jurisdiction over land of the decedent. The extent of
this jurisdiction, however, varies greatly. For convenience our subject
of inquiry may be stated in the form of three questions. First, does
the probate court have jurisdiction over the probate of a will of land?
Second, to what extent, if any, does the personal representative have
title to land during administration? Third, does the probate court
276 This, of course, refers to a minimum requirement. It would seem desirable,
aside from questions of constitutionality, to have some sort of notice for sales of land.
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exercise general control over the land of the decedent throughout the
course of administration? In other words, is the decedent's land subject
to the jurisdiction of the probate court from the initial steps to have
the will probated or to secure a grant of administration up to the time
of the final order of distribution?
l First, as to probate of wills of land, it is believed that the old
English doctrine that a will of land is not subject to probate has almost
entirely disappeared in this country. In nearly every jurisdiction a
testamentary disposition of land must be admitted to probate before
devisees can claim under it. This result in many states is based on
statutes to the effect that no will is effectual to pass title to real or
personal property without probate or that a will cannot be introduced
in evidence until admitted to probate.277 In a very few jurisdictions
the necessity for and effect of probate of a will of real property may
not be the same as that of a will involving personalty; but it is believed
that wills involving real property are subject to probate in all states.278
Second, does the personal representative have title to land during
administration? In general, the answer is that he does not. That is to
say, the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the old English view that
title to personalty passes to the personal representative, but that title
to real estate passes to the heir or devisee. 279 In no jurisdiction does
277
See, for example, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (90): "No will shall
be effectual to pass either real or personal estate, unless it shall have been duly proved
and allowed in the probate court as provided in this chapter, or on appeal, in the circuit
court or supreme court; and the probate of a will of real or personal estate, as above
mentioned, shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 394.130: "No will shall be received in evidence until
it has been allowed and admitted to record by a county court; and its probate before
such court shall be conclusive, except as to the jurisdiction of the court, until superseded,
reversed or annulled."
In some states the courts have decided, without the aid of a statute, that a will
devising land must be admitted to probate. Inge v. Johnston, 110 Ala. 650, 20 So.
757 (1895); Farris v. Burchard, 242 Mo. 1, 145 S. W. 825 (19u).
278 Thus, in New York (N.Y. Surrogates' Court Act,§ 144) specific provision is
made for the probate of a will involving real property. But there is some question
whether this is necessary in all cases. See Bouton v. Fleharty, 21 5 App. Div. l 80, 213
N.Y. Supp. 455 (1926); Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N.Y. 228, 43 N. E. 628 (1896).
And in Tennessee it would appear -that a will involving real property must be
admitted to probate. Weaver v. Hughes, (Tenn. 1943) 173 S. W. (2d) 159. But
the order admitting to probate may not have quite the same conclusive effect on real
property which it has with respect to personalty. State v. Lancaster, l 19 Tenn. 638,
105 S. W. 858 (1907); Grier v. Canada, 119 Tenn. 17, 107 S. W. 970 (1907).
279
Hooker v. Porter, 271 Mass. 441, 171 N. E. 713 (1930); Richards v. Pierce,
44 Mich. 444, 7 N. W. 54 (1880); Roorbach v. Lord, 4 Conn. 347 {1822). For
statutes providing that real estate passes directly to the heirs or devisees, see N. M.
Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-702; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1366. In
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title to all the decedent's realty pass to the personal representative as
is provided in the present English legislation. It is true, in Georgia,
Oregon i+nd Virginia, statutes provide that the title to land registered
under Land Registration Acts ( that is, so-called Torrens System registration) passes to the personal representative. 280 And a Georgia statute
indicates that in that state for some purposes title to devised land
passes to the executor and not to the devisee during administration; 281
but legislation in the same state provides that title to intestate land
passes to the heir.282
In two states,283 California and Texas, are found statutes which
indicate that titl~ to both real and personal property passes to the
distributee and not to the personal representative. The California
statute is as follows:
'
"When a person dies; the title to his property, real and personal, passes to the person, to whom it, is devised or bequeathed
by his last will, or, in the absence of such disposition, to the
persons who succeed to his estate as provided in Division z of this
code: but all of his property shall be subject to the possession of
the executor or administrator and to the control of the superior
court for the purposes of administration, sale or other disposition
under the provisions of Division 3 of this code, and shall be·
chargeable with the .expenses of administering his estate, and the
payment of his debts and the allowance to the family, except as
otherwise provided in this code."
general, see ATKINSON, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 528-530 (1937); 4 PAGE, WILLS,
3d ed., § 1586 (1941).
280
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) § 60-508; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §
70-368; Va. Code Ann. (1942) § 5225 (this section provides that the acts establishing
the Torrens system be 1=ontinued in force. Section 61 of that act as amended provides
that title to registered land vests in the personal representative).
281
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 193 7) § II 3-801: "All property, both real and personal, being assets to pay debts, no devise or legacy passes the title until the assent of
the executor is given to such devise or legacy."
And see Peck v. Watson, 165 Ga. 853, 142 S. E. 450 (1927).
282
Ga. Code Ann. (Park; 1937) § II3-901: "Upon the death of the owner of
any estate in realty, which estate survives him, the title shall vest immediately in his
heirs at law, subject to be administe~d by the legal representative, if there is one,
for the payment of debts ~nd the purposes of distribution."
288
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 300; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
1935) art: 3314.
In a few other states are found statutes which are to the effect that the property
of an intestate person, both real and personal, passes to his heirs subject to the control
of the court and to the possession of the administrator. The following are of this
variety: Idaho Code Ann. (1932) .§ 14-102; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. "(McFarland,
1935) § 7072; N. D. Comp. Laws (1'913) § 5742; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 84,
§ 212; S. D. Code (1939) § 56.0102.
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Much can be said for legislation of this character. Certainly, there is
no real justification today for a distinction between real and personal
estate with respect to the title of the personal representative. The
explanation for it is purely historical. But it is doubtful whether the
modern English rule giving the ·personal representative title to all
property of the decedent, both.real and personal, would work well in
the United States. Frequently estates are not administered at all. And
in such cases the matter of determining title would be simplified if
legislation like the California statute just quoted were in force. The
title is then in the distributees whether the estate has been administered
or not.
Of course, the mere fact that title to realty is in the distributee or
is in the personal representative, during administration, does not go far
in describing the real situation. In all jurisdictions, regardless of what
technical rule is in force as to the .location of title, the distributee has
some interest in the property as of the time of the decedent's death.28'
On the other hand, even under the California type of statute, it is clear
that the personal representative has a very substantial interest in the
estate during the course of administration, though it may be described
in terms of a right to possession or a power of disposition rather than,
in terms of title.
The third and most important question to be raised is: Does the
probate court exercise jurisdiction over the decedent's lands throughout
the course of administration? In many states there can be no doubt
that the answer is in the affirmative. Thus, in the California statute
as to the title of distributees, which has already been quoted, it is
stated that such title is "subject to the possession of the executor or
administrator and to the control of the superior court for the purposes
of administration, sale -or other disposition under the provisions of
Division 3 of this code." Another California statute provides that the
personal representative must take possession of all the estate of the
decedent, real and personal.285 In other states the matter is not so
clear; no such statutes as these are found. A:nd it is necessary to consider the jurisdiction of the probate court over land in a number of
specific situations, such as the contents of the inventory, judicial sales
and the decree of distribution. In some of these states we shall find
that the jurisdiction of the probate court is limited to particular proceedings with respect to land or to particular lands of the decedent.
28

See B[ewster v. Gage, (C.C.A. 2d, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 604, affd. 280 U. S.
s. Ct. II5 (1930).
285
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 571.
'
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But in others we may conclude from these specific prov1s1ons as to
jurisdiction that the court does have general jurisdiction over the
decedent's lands during the whole course of administration.
In a majority of states, statutes require that lands be included in
the inventory.286 It is believed, however, that this may not be of great
significance in determining the questio1?- of jurisdiction.287 Its purpose
may well be to enable the court to determine how large the estate is
and whether it is solvent. Thus, in Massachusetts land must be included in the inventory.288 Yet the personal representative ordinarily
has no right to the rents and profits during the administration. 289 The
decree of distribution does not deal with real estate.290 And, while sales
of land take place under license of the probate court, the personal
representative ·has no right to deal with any land until such license is
obtained.291 One writer on the subject has summed the matter up by
286 'Fhe statutes in the following states so provide: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §
38-803; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 600; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935)
c. 176, § 145; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 49n (all the property except real estate
situated outside the state); D.C. Code (1940) § 18-401 (inventory includes realty
only if court so orders); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 733.04 (all the property); Ga.
~ode Ann. (Park, 1936) §§ II3-1401, u3-1402 (includes real estate in the county
where administration is had); Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 15-403; Ill. Ann. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, §§ 323-324; Iowa Code (Reichman, 1939) § u913;
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1201; Me. Laws, 1935, c. 78, p. 257;
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 195, § 5; Mich. $tat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178
(382); Minn. Stat. (i941) § 525.33; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 58; Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. (Andersqn & McFarland, 1935) § 10131; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann.
(Dorsey, 1929) § 30-401; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) § 9882.100;
N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-302; N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-50;
N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8714; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §
10509-41 (real estate located in Ohio); Okla. Stat. Ann. ( 1941) tit. 58, § 283; Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 19-401; S. D. Code (1939) § 35.1203; Tex. Civ. Stat
Ann. (Vernon, 1925) § 3408; Utah Cqde Ann. (1943) § 102-7-3; Vt. Pub. Laws
(1933) § 2805; Va. Code Ann. (Iylichie, 1942) § 5403; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann
(Remington, 1932) § 1466; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 4182; Wis. Stat.
(1943) § 312.01 ("all the property"); Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §
88-2303.
287 ln Lindholm v. Nelson, 125 Kan. 223 at 229, 264 P. 50 (1928), the court
said: "There are several reasons why it is advisable to have the real estate listed in the
inventory, but this listing gives the administrator no authority over it, and gives the
probate court no jurisdiction to dispose of it, except under conditions specifically
provided by statute."
288 See ,note 13 supra.
289 Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100 ( 1870).
290 See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF EsTATEs AND FmucIARY LAw IN MASSACHUSETI's, 3d ed., § 210 (1937); Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 206, § 21.
291 Hoqker v. Porter, 271 Mass. 441, 171 N. E. 713 (1930).
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saying: 202 "Ordinarily, unless the will provides otherwise, the executor
or administrator has nothing directly to do with real estate." On the
other hand, in New York state, where the inventory does not include
real estate,293 the surrogate's court is by statute given power "in the
cases and in the manner prescribed by statute .... To direct the disposition of real property, and interests in real property of decedents,
and the disposition of the proceeds thereof" m and perhaps it may be
said that the court has at least potential, if not actual, Jurisdiction over
the decedent's land during probate.
In most states, sales of land to pay debts and legacies are, or can
be, handled in the probate court.20 G In others, it is necessary to initiate
an independent proceeding in the court of general jurisdiction for this
purpose.296 If a state is of the latter group, it is clear that the probate
court does not have general jurisdiction of land of the decedent. On
the other hand, if the sale is in the probate court, it may be that, as in
Massachusetts, only the specific piece of land to be sold comes under
the supervision of the probate court for this purpose.
Other provisions in various states, dealing with the jurisdiction of
the probate courts ( or of personal representatives) over land in particular situations, are statutes as to the specific performance of land
contracts,201 statutes as to the personal representative's right to the
292

NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETI'S, 3d ed., p. 189, § 76 (1937).
293
N. Y. Surrogates' Court Act, §§ 195-197.
29
4' Id. at § 40. The personal representative is given power to take possession of the
real property and sell, mortgage or lease it. N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, §§ 13 and
123. In general, see 3 WARREN'S HEATON, SURROGATES' CoURTS, 6th ed., § 230
(1941).
29
~ States in which the probate court (or other court exercising probate jurisdic~
tion) does not handle sales of land are Kentucky, Nebraska, Nlw Mexico and West
Virginia. In North Carolina the clerk of the superior court has the functions of a
probate court, but sales of real estate are handled by the superior court itself. Indiana
probably belongs to this group also. In that state the circuit court handles probate
business, sitting as a probate court, and also has ordinary civil jurisdiction. Sales of
land are handled in this court in a separate proceeding, but it may be questioned
whether such a proceeding is in the probate or civil side of the court.
In other states the probate court (or other court exercising probate jurisdiction)
has jurisdiction over sales of land. This jurisdiction may be exclusive, e.g., Ga. Code
Ann. (Park, 1937) § 24-1901, or concurrent with some other court, e.g., Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5396.
2 6
~ For a statute of this sort, see Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 301102.
297

See, for example, Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 193 2) c. 204, § 1; Mich. Stat.
Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (509) et seq.
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possession of land, or to the rents and profits of it, statutes as to his
right to bring particular suits with respect fo land,208 statutes providing
for a specific decree of distribution to include interests in land, statutes
providing for the partition of interests of distributees in land,209 and
statutes providing for the determination of heirship.800
Perhaps the most significant of these are the ones dealing with
the personal representative's control of real estate and with the decree
of distribution. The California statutes requiring the personal representative to take control of real estate have already been referred to.801
The Indiana statute provides that the personal representative may
· take possession of the real estate if there is no heir or devisee to take
possession, but does not require him to do so.802 Still other states vest
the right to possession of land in the heir or devisee.808 Some statutes
expressly provide that the personal representative is entitled to rents
298
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 573: ccActions for the recovery of any
property, real or personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to
determine any adverse claim thereon ••• may be maintained by and against executors
and administrators."
_
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 733.02 provides that the personal representative may
bring actions with respect to real property for the purpose of quieting title for trespass,
for waste, and against co-tenants. Provision is also made for heirs or devisees themselves, or jointly with the personal representative, to bring suits for the possession or
recovery of real estate or to quiet the title thereto.
While presumably in neither of these states would the suit be brought as an action
in probate, the personal representative would, in suing, be acting as an appointee of
the court sitting in probate.
299
These are of two kinds: (a) those providing for partition _where the decedent
was a co-tenant. Here the suit would not ordinarily be in the probate court. See Cal.
Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 575. (b) They may provide for a partition in the
probate court by heirs or devisees who take the decedent's land as co-tenants.
800 In a jurisdiclion where there is a specific order of distribution which includes
land, the proceeding for the determination of heirship is likely to be an independent
proceeding, whether it is in the probate court or not, because it is chiefly employed
in a case where there has been no administration proceeding. See Minn. Stat. (1941)
§ ·525.31, where the proceeding is in the probate court, and applies to unadministered
land or to situations "when real estate or any interest therein has not been included in
a final decree." But compare Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (145) to 27.3178
(149) where the determination is in the probate court and may be either independent
of or a' part of the administration proceeding. Where the personal representative does
not take charge of land and the probate court does not purport to distribute it, it would
seem that the determination of heirship is an independent proceeding. See Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 3, §§ 209-2II (probate court).
801 See notes Io and I 2 supra.
802
See Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-n51.
808
Mo. Rev, Stat. Ann. (1942) § 129 (personal representative' not entitled to
possession or to rents and profits except on court order).
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and profits of land,804 and, indeed, this would seem to be implied where
he is given a right to possession.
In a considerable number of states the decree of distribution must
make a specific distribution of real and personal property of the estate.
Thus, the Michigan statute on this subject reads in part as follows: 3011
" ... the probate court shall, by order for that purpose, assign
the residue of the estate, if any, to such persons as are by law
entitled to the same ..•.
"In such order the court shall . • • name the persons and the
proportions or parts to which each shall be entitled."
It is not uncommon to have a statute such as the above followed by
provisions for the partition of interests of co-distributees. Thus the
provisions in the Michigan probate code on this subject begin as follows:sos

"When the estate, real or personal, assigned to 2. or more
heirs, devisees or legatees shall be in common and undivided, and
the respective shares shall not be separated and distinguished •••
the proba.te court may on the petition of any of the persons interested fix a date for hearing on the partition and distribution."
In other states the only provisions for a decree of distribution .are
restricted to personal property.807
Returning to our original question, it would seem that if statutes
give the personal representative possession of the real estate during the
administration and provide for a probate decree distributing the real
estate to those entitled, the probate court does have jurisdiction over
the decedent's lands throughout the course of administration. On the
other hand we may in some instances reach the same conclusion without
both of these types of statutes. But in other states, all we can conclude
is that the probate court does have jurisdiction of the decedent's lands
in certain matters during administration.
In conclusion, it is apparent that a majority of probate courts have
a very considerable jurisdiction over land. While it is true that the
mere filing of an inventory which includes land or the probati.ng of a
will devising land does not call for any extensive knowledge of land
law, when it comes to making a specific decree distributing land, the
same knowledge of the intricacies of the law of real property is required of the probate judge as is called for in the case of the trial judge
804

E.g., Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-809.
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 27.3178 (165), 27.3178 (166).
sos Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (168).
307
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 19-1201, 19-1202.
11011
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who construes a complicated land trust agreement. Indeed, whether
the statutes specifically empower the probate court to construe wills
or not ( and many of them- in fact do so) 308 the judge who makes a
specific decree of distribution, such as is required by the Michigan
statute already quoted, must be prepared to construe an intricate testamentary disposition of land. When we add to that the fact that many
statutes also give the probate court jurisdiction of test11,mentary trusts
involving land, and even, in some states, of inter vivas trusts involving
land, the conclusion is hard to avoid that a judge is needed in the
probate court who is as well qualified as the judge of the trial court
of general jurisdictio~. Indeed it might be said that he should be a
specialist in the law of property in its broadest aspects.

VI
JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS OVER MATTERS OTHER THAN
DECEDENTS' ESTATES

The scope of probate court functions has ever been a varying one.
We have already traced one aspect of this in noting an expanding
jurisdiction and control over the administration of decedents' estates.
Jurisdiction in otl~er fields has also been gradually added to that pas.:
sessed by the probate court as an established institution. The totality
of its functions today makes the maintenance of a probate court in every
county almost a necessity.
Mention has been made of the origin of orphans' courts in this
country.809 If it was a natural step for probate jurisdiction to be conferred upon orphans' courts, it certainly was not an unnatural step for
a jurisdiction over minors and their estates to be added to organized
probate courts elsewhere. The historical amalgamation of guardianship
and curatorship with probate jurisdiction is readily understandable
where occasioned by the administration upon a decedent's estate in
which minors are interested.
In England guardians of the person and property of minors were
appointed by the court of chancery and the court of exchequer. 310 They
were also appointed by ecclesiastical courts with respect to personalty.311
In America a general power to make such appointments has always been
regarded as inherent'in courts poss~sing equity powers.312 No interest
sos N.
309

Y. Surrogates' Court Act§ 40, subd. 8.
See discussion under II-B at note 59 supra.

' 810 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP
811

312

Id. at § 3.
Id. at § 18.

§ 16 (1897).
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in a decedent's estate is necessary to invoke this power. But the ex-:
pensiveness and cumbersomeness of equity procedure early led to
giving this jurisdiction-at least a concurrent one-to other courts.313
Guardianship of the persons of minors and of their estates has since become an established part of probate jurisdiction.814 A constitutional
provision conferring general jurisdiction upon probate courts in all
probate matters has been said to include the power to appoint guardians. 315 Only in rare cases does equity appoint guardians or assume a
continuing control over them. 316
See, for example, Complete Revisal of all the Acts of Assembly of the Province
of North Carolina, printed by Davis, 285-291 (1773) and Laws of North Carolina,
edited by Iredell, 202-208 (1791) (act of 1762) •• see also WoERNER, AMER~CAN
LAw oF GUARDIANSHIP, § 18 (1897).
314
This development is fully described in WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP § 24 (1897). Jurisdiction over guardians of minors and their estates is
vested in the court exercising probate jurisdiction as follows: Ala. Code Ann. (1940)
tit. 13, § 278; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 42-101; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §
2883; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 1405; Colo. Const., art. 6, § 23; Colo.
Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 76, § 1, c. 176, § 83; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §§
4973, 4808; Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 89; D. C. Code (1940) § 11-504; Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1941) § 36.01; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 24-1901; Idaho Const.,
art. 5, § 21; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 1-1202; Ill. Const., art. 6, §§ 18, 20;
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 37, § 303; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§§ 4-303, 4-2910, 4-3010; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10763; Kan. Const.,
art. 3, § 8; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-301; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1942) §§ 25.110, 387.020; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 9; Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) art. 93, § 152; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, §§ 3, 4;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178(19); Minn. Const., art. 6, § 7; Minn. Stat.
(1941) § 525.54; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 404; Mo. Const., art. 6, § 34; Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 2437; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland,
1935) § 10401; Neb. Const., art. 5, § 16; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929)
§§ 27-503, 27-504; Nev. Const., art. 6, § 6; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, §
4; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:7-23.1, 3:7-28; N. M. Stat. Ann. (19_41) § 16-410;
N. Y. Surrogates' Court Act,§§ 40, 173; N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§
2-16, 33-1; N. D. Const., art. 4, § 111; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8524;
Ohio Const., art. 4, § 8; Ohio Gen. Code Anh. (Page, 1937) § 10501-53; Okla.
Const., art. 7, § 13; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 20, § 271; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940) §§ 13-501, 22-101; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 2241; R. I.
Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 426 and c. 569, § I; S. C. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 208,
209; S. D. Const., art. 5, § 20; S. D. Code (1939) §§ 35.1801 et seq. and 32.0909;
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 10225; Tex. Const., art. 5, § 16; Tex. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925) art. 4102 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-131 et
seq.; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2723; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5316; Wash.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1371; W. Va. Const., art. 8, § 24; W. Va.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 357; Wis. Stat.' (1943) §§ 253.03, 319.01; Wyo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) c. 50.
m Stewart Oil Co. v. Lee, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 173 S. W. (2d) 791; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hansen, 36 Okla. 459, 129 P. 60 (1912); .Monastes v. Catlin, 6 Ore. I 19 (1876).
816
WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP 52-53 (1897).
313
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Guardianship over insane persons, lunatics, idiots, imbeciles or
incompetents by whatever name they may be called, originally within
the jurisdiction o~ the English chancery courts, has also been lodged for
the most part in established probate courts in this country or in courts
exercising probate jurisdiction.817
Recognizing the need for some supervision over incompetents and
to satisfy the requirement of the federal law designed to insure that
the compensation and insurance paid by the U.S. Veterans' Bureau is
properly conserved for their benefit, servicemen, their estates and dependents, thirty-four states have enacted the Uniform Veteran's Guardianship Act with some variations.818 A degree of uniformity has thus
been attained in the appointment of guardians for such servicemen
and the administration of their estates derived from the Veterans'
Administration. The original act as promulgated by the Co~issioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1928 provides for guardianship proceedings
817
Ibid. Curatorship or conservatorship over estates of insane persons and other
incompetents is vested in the court exercising probate jurisdiction as follows: Ala.
Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 278; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 42-135; Ark. Dig.
Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 2883; Cal. Prob. Code (Deeering, 1941) § 1405; Colo. Const.,
art. 6, § 23; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 105, § 9, c. 176, § 84; Conn. Gen.
Stat. (1930) § 4815; Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 89; D. C. Code (1940) tit. 21, c. 2
(limited jurisdiction only)-; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 744.24 et seq.; Ga. Code Ann.'
(Park, 1936) § 24-1901; Idaho Const., art. 5, § 21; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §
1-1202; Ill. Const., art. 6, §§ 18, 20; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 37, §
303; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-30.3, 4-2910, 4-3010; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10763; Kan. Const., art. 3, § 8; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick,
Supp. 1943) § 59-301; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 25.uo, 387.020, 387.210; Me.
Rev. Stat. (I<j30) c. 75, § 9; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 3; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178(19); Minn. Const., art. 6, § 7; Minn. Stat. (1941)
§ 525.54; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 430; Mo. Const., art. 6, § 34; Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (1942) § 2437; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §
10412; Neb. Const., art. 5, § 16; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) §§ 27-503,
27-504; Nev. Const., art. 6, § 6; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, § 4; N. J. Rev.
Stat. (1937) §§ 3:7-33, 3:7-41; N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 16-410; N. C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 2-16, 33-1; N. D. Const., art. 4, § III; N. D. Comp.
Laws Ann. (1913) § 8524; Ohio Const., art. 4, § 8; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page,
1937) § 10501-53,; Okla. Const., art. 7, § 13; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 20, §
271; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 13-501, 22-101; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 20, § 2241; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 426 and c. 569, § I; S. C.
Code Ann. (1942) §§ 208, 209; S. D. Const., art. 5, § 20; S. D. Code (1939) §§
35.1801 et seq. and 32.0909; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 10225; Tex.
Const., art. 5, § 16; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. _(Vernon, 1925) art. 4102 et seq.; Utah
Code Ann. (1,943) § 102-13-1 et seq.; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2723; Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1942) § 1050; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1371; W. Va.
Const., art. 8, § 24; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 35n Wis. Stat. (1943) §§
253.03, 319.01; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) c. 50.
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to be had in "any court of competent jurisdiction." 819 The revision of
this act by the commissioners in I 942 makes no mention of any specific
court.820 Nowhere is a reference to be found as to whether the probate,
equity or court of general jurisdiction is referred to. Presumably the
court where guardianships for other incompetents are cognizable is
intended.
Jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents has involved totally different
problems from general supervision over the property of minors or incompetents. Juvenile courts have been created in many places.821 In
some states such jurisdiction has been merely added to that of courts of
general jurisdiction. In Idaho, Michigan and South Dakota it has been
tacked on to the jurisdiction of probate courts.822
More closely related to the primary function of the administration
of estates is the supervision over testamentary trusts. While it is true
that the administration of a decedent's estate ceases upon final settlement and distribution by the personal representative to the testamentary trustee, it is also true, in a very real sense, that the subsequent
administration by the testamentary trustee is but a continuation of the
administration by the executor or administrator. In any matter requiring it, the jurisdiction of equity might be invoked at the instance of the
trustee or of any beneficiary either as a remedial or a declaratory
process. Any such procedure could be repeated any number of times.
The more often equity jurisdiction is invoked in the administration of a
single trust, the more nearly it approaches complete supervisory jurisdiction. Equity has the power to exercise and frequently does exercise
such complete supervision. Because of the similarity of the problems
involved, the close relationship between the probate administration of
the decedent's estate and the continued administration of the testamentary trust created by the decedent's will, and the fact that the
trustee is often the same person who has served as executor, there has
been a marked tendency to subject the latter administration to probate,
.rather than equity, supervision. Such is now an integral part of the
818

See 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 735 (1942).
Uniform Veteran's Guardianship Act (1928) § 4.
820
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (1942) § 5.
821
For a discussion of this jurisdiction and of the various courts established to
handle such matters, seee 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, § 277 (1932) and
Supplement (1938).
822
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 31-1302; Mich. Const., art. 7, § 13; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178(571); S. D. Code (1939) § 43.0302. In a few other
states probate courts have been given jurisdiction in juvenile matters in certain counties.
319

1 34

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

probate statutes of some twenty-four states.328 An examination of these
statutes reve_als that the amount of such supervision varies from a duty
on the part of the trust~e to account periodically to the court to a more
or less complete supervision approximating that of the probate court
over the executor in the prior administration of the estate of the decedent.
Many of the same arguments could be assigned for subjecting inter
vivos trusts to the same supervision. Only a preceding probate administration is lacking. However, many settlors prefer not to subject
the trust created by them to judicial supervision, but to rely upon the
integrity and ability of the trustee whom they have selected. Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada and Pennsylvania have brought inter
vivos trusts under the supervisory control of probate courts.324 In
Maine such jurisdiction may be invoked either in the probate or superior court. 325 In Kansas such jurisdiction is possible where the beneficiary is a person under guardianship.326 Recent legislation has extended this jurisdiction to include life insurance trusts in ~ennsylvania.327
828
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-1509 (for settlement of accounts); Cal. Prob.
Code (Deeering, 1941) § II20; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1943) c. 176,
§ 227 (but testator may provide for no supervision in county court); Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1930) §§ 4972-4976; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-2910, 4-3010 (in Marion
and Vanderburgh counties) and (Burns, Supp. 1943) §§ 6-2501 to 6-2526; Iowa
Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 10764, II876; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1943)
§§ 59-1601 to 59-16II (but testator may provide for no supervision in probate court);
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 2, c. 82, §§ 1-13 (concurrent with superior court);
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 6; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §
27.3178(19); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10352;
Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) §§ 30-1801 1:,9 1806; Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §§ 7718-7718.26; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 363; N. J.
Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1941-43) §§ 3:7-13.4, 3:7-13.5 (only to qualify and have letters
issued); N: Y. Surrogates' Court Act, §§ 167-171 (limited control); N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-53 (for filing inventory and rendering accounts); Ohio
Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 10501-53, 10506-39; Pa_. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 20, § 2242 (orphans' court); S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 209; Utah Code
Ann. (1943) §§ 102-12-31, 102-12-32 (for rendition of accounts); Vt. Pub. Laws
(1933) c. 134 (for rendition of annual accounts); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington,
Supp. 1941) §§ u548-1 to n548-28, as amended by Wash. Laws, 1943, c. 152;
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.03.
824 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 4-2910, 4-3010 and (Burns, Supp. 1943)
§§ 6-2512 et seq.; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 10764, u876; Mass. Ann.
Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 6; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §§
7718.II, 7718.12; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) tit. 20, § 2253a.
825
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 2; c. 82, §§ 14-16.
826 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1601 to 59-16II.
827
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,'Supp. 1943) tit. 20, § 2253b.
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A number of other functions have been added piecemeal to the
broadening horizon of probate jurisdiction. Marriages may be solemnized by probate judges in some states.328 Divorces may be granted in
the probate courts of Massachusetts,829 and in the county courts of
Colorado 33 0- if the amount of alimony sought does not exceed $2000.
Adoption proceedings have been lodged here in :more than one-third of
the states; 881 and proceedings for change of name in a few states.882
The granting of writs of habeas corpus has also been given to some
probate courts,833 presumably on the assumption that when the general
trial judge is not available, the probate judge can function since he is a
judicial officer.
The combination of small civil and criminal jurisdiction with probate matters has been alluded to in discussing the early history of pro828 No attempt is made here to collect the legislation on this subject. Frequently
this power is bestowed upon judges of courts of record.
829
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 3.
88
°
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 56, § 3.
881
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 27, §§ 1-9; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 254;
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 4, § 1 (jurisdiction in district or county court
provided there is no juvenile court in the county); Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §§ 48094810; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3550-3553 (orphans' court); Idaho Code Ann.
(1932) § 31-II06; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 4, §§ 1-13 (in circuit or
county court); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 3-II5; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2101; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 405.140 to 405.990;
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 9; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 210, § I and
c. 215, § 3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (541) et seq.; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann.
(Dorsey, 1929) § 43-101 et seq.; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, § 5; N. J. Rev.
Stat. (1937) § 9:3-1 (orphans' court); N. Y. Domestic Relations Law § 109 et seq.
(concurrent with certain other courts); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1943)
§§ 10512-9 to 10512-23; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 10, §§ 46, 49; Ore. Comp.
Laws Ann. (1940) § 63-401; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1943) tit. I §§ 1-5
(orphans' court except in Philadelphia county where the municipal court has jurisdiction); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § I; S. D. Code Ann. (1939) §§ 14.0401
to 14.0408; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9561, 10225 (concurrent with
circuit court); Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3322 as amended by Vt. Laws, 1941, No. 46,
§ 2; Wis. Stat. (1943) c. 322.
In Arizona, California, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming adoption proceedings are had in the court of general jurisdiction, which also handles probate matters.
882
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 401.010 to 401.040; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75,
§ 9; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §
27.3178 (541-545, 561-562); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ II-701 to 11-703;
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § I; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938)
§ 10225.
888
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 297; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §
4-2910; Kan. Const., art. 3, § 8; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §
59-301; Ohio Const., art. 4, § 8; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10501-53;
Ore. Const., art. 7, § 13.
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bate courts.884 In a dozen states at the present time limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction is lodged in the court having probate jurisdiction.885
·
•
Some form of inheritance or estate taxes are now levied by every
state except Nevada. The assessment of such a tax must needs occur
more or less contemporaneously with the administration of the estate,
because values at the date of death will determine the amount of tax
and payment by the personal representative out of assets in his hands is
the most feasible and certain way of securing payment to the sovereign.
In the determination of the tax the .services and offices of the probate
court in charge of the administration will be needed. The nature of the
part to be played by the probate court in the accomplishment of this
task varies all the way from furnishing information to those actually
assessing the tax to the actual assessment of the tax itself. The former
method of having the probate court furnish the information and data to
those charged with the assessing function exists in Delaware, Oklahoma
and South Carolina.886 In nearly half the states this task is performed
by or under the direction of the probate court,887 while in a few others
the probate court on appeal may hear and determine all questions relating to such tax. 888
884

See discussion under II-B and notes 72 and 73 supra.
A limited civil or criminal jurisdiction, or both, is vested in the court having
jurisdiction in probate matters in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin.
886
Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 138; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 68, § 989r;
S. C. Code Ann. ( 1942) § 2489.
m Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495, §§ 15, 16; Colo. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1935) c. 85, § 59; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1935) § 1380; Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) § 14-417; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1940) c. 120, §§ ~85, 388;
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6:.2410; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 7336; Md.
Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) §§ 81-109 to 81-140; Minn. Stat. (1941) § 291.25; Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 586 ;Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935)
§ 10400.13; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) §§ 77-2211, 77-2213; N. Y.
Tax Law §§ 249t, 249w; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) §§ 2346 b 26,
b 25, b 38 as amended by N. D. Laws, 1927, c. 267, § 4; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page,
1937) §§ 5340, 5345; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 20-135; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2321; S. D. Code (1939) §§ 57.2202, 57.2305, 57.2307; Tex.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 7131; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 80-12-15; Vt.
Pub. Laws (1933) §§ 1058, 1063-1067; Wis. Stat. (1943) §§ 72.12, 72.15, 72.55.
838
Ark. Acts, 1941, Act 136, p. 333; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 1384; Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1940) c. 120, § 388; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 65, §
27; N. Y. Tax Law, § 249x; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § IIo; W. Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 862.
835
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VII
THE PERSONNEL oF THE PROBATE CouRT

A. The Probate Judge
The problem of probate court organization is not unrelated to the
personnel of probate courts. Efficiency of operation demands competence on the part of those persons who are charged with the duty of
administering the business of such courts. In the administration of
decedents' estates probate courts have supervision of matters having a
financial value far in excess of what is commonly believed. Justices of
the peace are usually restricted to a jurisdiction of a few hundred dollars, whereas probate judges are given exclusive jurisdiction of estates
that may be valued in the thousands or millions of dollars. In approximately one-half of the states, it is possible to elect laymen to office.
The probate court of one such state has been characterized as "a court
that is not required to know any law and that does not know any more
than the law requires." 3-39

r. American Failures to Appraise the Standards for the Office
It is generally accepted that supreme court and trial judges should
be capable men-"learned in the law," as is sometimes said. From the
earliest time such a requirement has occupied a permanent place in the
constitutions of most states. In the few states where this is not a constitutional or statutory requirement, persons elected or appointed to,
such positions have nevertheless been lawyers, due largely to the general feeling that such should be the case. Similar requirements were
seldom made for probate judges. The reasons for this were several. In
the first place, most of the work of probate judges was nonlitigious in
character. It was also largely administrative. Secondly, the creation of
separate probate courts in each county has given rise to a belief that each
county could not support· an office of probate judge with such qualifications. Furthermore, men with such qualifications have not always been
available in every commnity. Lower requirements, shorter tenure, and
smaller salaries have been the solution.840
In the meantime the economic and social elements of life have become more complex and technical. This is reflected in the complex
provisions of wills and trusts, and the character of property 9wnership,
389

Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Mining Co., 12 N. M. 2II at 226, 78 P. 63
,
840
See Atkinson, "Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Probate
Judges," 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 93 at 94 (1939).
(1904).
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all of which require the supervision of probate judges. The probate
of wills, the granting of letters, and the approval of final settlements
no longer constitute the bulk of their duties. A knowledge of business,
investments and accounting are a necessary part of th~ equipment of a
modern probate judge. Complicated wills require interpretation to
assure proper administration and distribution. Under many statutes the
equitable jurisdiction of probate courts has been increased in response
to a need. 841 Indeed our probate courts have always combined the jurisdiction and power-s of the English ecclesiastical and chancery courts, but
seldom have we stopped to consider the full implications of this latter
jurisdiction. The modern probate judge needs to know, more than ever
before, general substantive law in order to supervise the activities of
fiduciaries and to insure justice to every class of beneficiaries. Furthermore the whole problem of the_ administration of decedents' estates
needs to be viewed as one of transferring the various forms of wealth
owned and controlled by the decedent to the persons ultimately entitled thereto, viz., creditors, the state ( as entitled to inheritance taxes),
heirs, devisees, and legatees. The task requires not merely a manual
transfer, but an effective legal transfer so that there will be no cause to
question its effectiveness in the future. The very fact of the nonlitigious
character of the proceeding suggests that an additional competence and
intelligence be exercised by those entrusted with this duty.
Another phenomenon has also occurred to increase and complicate
the task of the probate judge. Guardianships and curatorships of
minors, insane persons, incompetents and war veterans, adoptions,
change of name, solemnization of marriages and granting of divorces
in some few states, have been added gradually to that of administering
decedents' estates. Each of these functions demands a penetrating and
specialized understanding of human nature.842 In a number of states
jurisdiction over testamentary trusts, and in a few instances over inter
vivos and insurance trusts, has been added. Some part in the assessment
of inheritance taxes has been added to probate duties in practically every
state. In the midst of these added duties, no probate judge has been
heard to complain of lack of sufficient work to do.
Standards for the Office of Probate Judge
(a) Qualifications. The qualifications required for office of probate
judge have not been as exacting as those of general circuit or district
2.

For a recent summary. of this development see note, "Equitable Jurisdiction of
Probate Courts and Finality of Probate Decrees," 48 YALE L. J. 1273 (1939).
842 See discussion under VI supra.
•
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judges. Admission to the bar or being learned in the law is a usual
constitutional requirement for the latter. Legal or judicial experience
is commonly an additional requirement. In the case of probate judges,
however, the standards are but faintly comparable. In approximately
one-half of the states 848 probate judges are not required to be lawyers
or to have had any legal experience. This makes it possible for laymen
to administer the affairs of this office, and in many localities this is the
case.844 It has been observed many times that a law school diploma and
membership in the bar are not in themselves certifications of competence. It is equally true that the absence of these is not a mark of
incompetence. The affairs of many probate courts presided over by laymen are administered with integrity and common sense. But it should
be obvious that no layman, however efficient or conscientious, should be
expected to appreciate and pass upon the multitudinous legal aspects involved in the administration of an estate. The fact that he can fill out
the blanks in a printed form does not imply an intelligence necessary
for the effective sale or lease of a piece of real estate owned by the
decedent, nor the wisdom to adjudicate the conflicting claims of heirs or
beneficiaries. Since many matters are not questioned at the time or subjected to the scrutiny of immediate appellate review, something close
to perfection is desirable to eliminate any question of their efficacy at
some distant time.
Maine, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin have seen fit to require that
probate judges shall have become members of the bar-as a prerequisite
to holdin,g office.845 In California, Nevada, Washington, Montana,
Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Virginia and
North Carolina, probate matters are under the jurisdiction of the courts
848 Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware (register of wills), Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey (surrogates' and orphans' court judges), Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (in a very few counties).
344 As an example, see Smith, "Some Comments on the District Probate System,"
7 CoNN. BAR J. 56 (1933).
845
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 3, as amended by Me. Laws, 1933, c. 62; Md.
Const., art. 4, § 2; N. Y. Const., art. 6, § 19 (except as to county of Hamilton); N. D.
Const., art. 4, § II 1; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10501-1 (or have
previously served as probate judge immediately prior to election); Okla. Const., art.
7, § II; Pa. Const., art. 5, § 22; S. D. Const., art. 5, § 25; Wis. Stat. (1943) §
253.02 (except in counties having a population of less than 14,000 or have previously
served as probate judge provided the county court has no civil or criminal jurisdiction).
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of general jurisdiction and hence administered by the judges of those
courts. Among this group of states, all but Indiana and North Carolina
make admission to the bar an essential requirement in order to qualify
for this office.846 And in Arkansas and Mississippi, where probate matters come under the jurisdiction of chancery judges, a similar requirement is made of these judges.84!, In Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, where probate courts are essentially on a par with the courts of general jurisdiction, the require- ments for the office of probate judge are in each instance the same as for
trial judges and include admission to the bar,848 except in Massachusetts
and New Jersey where no such requirement is made for any judicial
office. It should be said, however, that the long record of successful
judicial administration in that state indicates the presence of other factors in producing the high quality of its judiciary.
To inaugurate a system in any state designed to raise the qualifications for probate judges is easier said than done. In the :first place the
public is not fully appreciative of the necessity of such a move, for the
reasons already discussed. Secondly, there are laymen already occupying these offices, some of whom are doing a creditable job, who feel that
they have a. vested interest in that office as long as their constituents are
willing to elect them. Such a system was proposed in Kansas in 1939'
in connection with the adoption of a new probate code which had been
carefully studied and drafted to accomplish a needed improvement in
probate administration. In order not to oust those who had previously
held the office of probate judge, it was provided that only members of
the bar or past probate judges should be eligible for that office. The
pressure against this reform, however, was so great as to cause its
elimination from the code upon its adoption. 849 Such a provision did
:find approval in Ohio and Wisconsin, however.8 ~0
(b) Method of Selection. Originally surrogates or deputies held
their offices by appointment from the governor. With an increasing
need for permanent deputies of that kind, the office beca111-e assimilated
846 Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 5; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, l 941) § l 57; Cal.
Const., art. 6, § 23; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10815; La. Const., art 7,
§ 39; Mont. Const., art. 8, § 16; Nev. Comp. Laws (~illy.er, Supp. 1941) § 618;
Utah Const., art. 8, § 5; Va. Const., art. 6, § 96; Wash. Const., art. 4, § 17; Wyo.
Const., art. 5, § 12.
847 Ark. Const., art. 7, § 16; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 2819; Miss.
Const., art. 6, § 154.
•
·
848 Md. Const., art. 4, § 2; N. Y. Const., art. 6, § 19; Pa. Const., art. 5, § 22.
849 See note to § 3 of "The Kansas Probate Code," 13 KAN. JuD. CouN. BuL.
12 (1939).
·
850
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10501-1; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.02.
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to various other judicial offices for the purpose of selecting the occupant. In New York and New Jersey, for example, the office of surrogate, originally appointive, later became elective. The judges of the
orphans' courts in Delaware and New Jersey, and the probate judges of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire are appointed by the governors of
those states, as are the judges of courts of general jurisdiction.851 Circuit judges in Virginia, who exercise most of the control over the administration of estates are chosen by the legislature;_ 852 but the clerks
of the circuit courts in Virginia, who exercise a small part of probate
jurisdiction, are elected locallyt858 Probate judges in Rhode Island are
elected by the town councils.854. In Connecticut, Florida and Maine
probate judges are elected, whereas general trial judges are appointed
by the governor.855 Elsewhere the office of probate judge is elective.
It would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss the relative
merits of the various methods of selecting judges. The appointive
method is largely confined to a few eastern states and a portion of New
England. The experience of that system over a period· of several
generations has been found to secure the very best in judicial talent.858
Where general trial judges are appointed, there would seem to be no
reason for employing a different method in the selection of probate
judges.
( c) Tenure. The question of tenure, like that of qualifications for
office, has received much discussion.857 Frequent approval of judicial
officers by means of frequent elections is said to represent a democratic
ideal. Longer tenure designed to secure an efficient, fearless and
courageous administration of office is a contrary objective. A tenure
of such duration as to attract competent, public-spirited men from a
Del. Const., art. 4, § 3; N. J. Const., art. 7, § 2 (2); N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§ 2:6-2; Mass. Const., c 2, § 1, art. 9; N. H. Const., arts. 46, 73. Such appointments
1151

must be confirmed by the senate in Delaware and New Jersey. The United States
district judges in the District of Columbia, who also sit in probate, are appointed by
the President of the United States.
852
Va. Const., art. 6, § 96.
853
Va. Const., art. 6, § 112; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § i24.
m R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938), c. 568, § 3.
855
Conn. Const., art. 5, § 3 and amend. 21; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4764
(superior court judges are appointed by the legislature upon nomination by the governor) ; Fla. Const., art. 5, §§ 8, 16; Me. Const., art. 6, §§ 4, 7; Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1930)
c. 75, § 3. Confirmation of circuit judges by the senate is required in Florida.
858
See references under note 357 infra.
857
,
See "Report of Special Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure," 63
AM. B. A. REP. 406 (1938); Hutcheson, "Administrative Officers," 23 A.B.A.J. 930
(1937); McCormick, "Judicial Selection-C{!rrent Plans and Trends," 30 ILL. L.
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more lucrative business is of primary importance. In each state the
term of office is likely to emphasize only one of these ideals or objectives.
Terms of office range all the way from one year to life tenure.
Two and four year terms are most common, though six years is not
uncommon. The term of judges of the orphans' courts in Pennsylvania
is ten years," in Delaware twelve years, and in Maryland fifteen years.
The surrogates in New York City are elected for terms of fourteen
years, whereas surrogates in other counties of New York hold office
for only six years. 358 In the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire probate judges are appointed for life,359
These terms of office in themselves are significant only as they
reflect one or more of the objectives enumerated above. The importance attributed to probate courts is to be observed by comparing the
term of office of probate judges with that of judges of courts of general
jurisdiction.3 ~0 If the term is less, the office is less likely to attract the
REv. 446 (1935); "Report of the Cincinnati Conference on the Selection and Tenure
of Judges in Ohio," 8 UNIV, CIN. L. REv. 359 (1934); Freightner, "Judicial Selection and Tenure," I 5 IND. L. J. 215 (1940); Wood, "Judicial Selection and Tenure,"
9 RocKY MT. L. REV. 197 (1937); Swa_ncara, "Short Terms as Debilitators of the
American Judiciary," II RocKY MT. L. REv. 217 (1939); Daniels, "Selection and
Tenure of Judges," 8 DuKE B. A. J. I (1940); Hyde, "Selection and Tenure of
Judges," 27 A.B.A.J. 763 (1941).
858
New York County Law, § 230.
359
U. S. Const., art. 3, § I (the United States district judges for the District
of Columbia serve as probate judges there; D. C. Code (1940) § 11-501); Mass.
Const., c. 3, art. I; N. H. Const., arts., 73, 78 (not beyond age 70).
560 The following table will indicate the tenure of each office:
Probate Judge
Trial Judge
6
Alabama
6
6 ( chancery judge)
Arkansas
4
6
Colorado
4
Connecticut
8
2
12
Delaware
4 (register)
6
Florida
4
Geor~ia
4
4
ldalio
2
4
6
Illinois•
4
2
Kansas
4
6
Kentucky
4
Maine
7
4
Maryland
. 15
15
Life
Massachusetts
Life
6
Michigan
4
Minnesota
6
4
Mississippi
4 (chancery judge)
4
Missouri
6
4
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same calibre of talent than the latter office. In about one-third of
the states the terms of both offices are the same. In Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Ohio the four
year term for probate judges and a six year term for circuit or district
judges is provided. In Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota and
Texas two and four year terms respectively are provided; in New
Mexico and North Dakota two and six years; in Maine four and seven
years; in Tennessee one and eight years; in North Carolina four and
eight years; in West Virginia six and eight years. In Connecticut probate judges are elected for two year terms, whereas general trial judges
are appointed for life.
(d) Salary. The variations in salaries of pr~bate judges reflect
both a variation in monetary values in different localities and the importance attached to the office locally. The question of salary, like the
question of tenure, is in large measure determinative of the kind of
person who will seek the office.
Much variation is to be found in the prevailing practices for compensating probate judges. Some are expected to be content with fees.
Some must turn over to the county or state all fees in excess of a designated amount. In either case the net amount of compensation reProbate Judge
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey

4

Life
5 (surrogate)
5 (orphans' court judge)

Trial Judge

4

Life

5
5

New Mexico
2
6
New York
6 (14 in New York City)
14
North Carolina
4 (clerk)
8
North Dakota
2
6
Ohio
4
6
Oklahoma
2
4
Oregon
6
6
Pennsylvani~
4 (register or wills)
IO
Rhode Island
?
Life
South Carolina
4
4
South Dakota
2
4
Tennessee
I
8
Texas
2
4
Vermont
2
2
Virginia
8 (clerk)
8
West Virginia
6
8
Wisconsin
6
6
In Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Utah and
Wyoming, there is identity of judges of the two courts and hence of their terms of
office. Where life tenure is indicated, good behavior is implied and retirement at age
seventy is sometimes provided.
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ceived by a probate judge will depend on the amount of business in his
jurisdiction, which in turn depends on the population and wealth.
Some states have a fixed salary for probate judges throughout the
state; others have adopted a variable scale depending upon the county
(presumably based upon population) or upon the population of the
county directly. In a few instances the amount of salaries is left to local
boards; 361 or the amount of salary provided by statute may be supplemented locally where warranted by the volume of business and the
population.362 In certain places additional compensation is paid for
additional services, such as acting as juvenile judge,368 or in connection
with inheritance tax appraisements.364
As in the case of tenure of office, the amount of compensation in
each case is to be compared with that received by the judges of the
courts of general jurisdiction.865 In most cases the two salaries are
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 25.250; N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§
28-171, 3903; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 59.15.
•
862 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-3201 through 3219; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann.
(1938) c. 574, §§ 3, 5·
868
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § z7.3178 (4).
864 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 580; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937)
§ '5348-lOa.
365 The following table will serve as a basis for comparison:
Probate Judge
Trial Judge
Fees*
$5000-8000
Alabama
$3600
3600
Arkansas
l 200-7000
5000
Colorado
Fees
12000
Connecticut
-1500-4000 (register) ·
10000-10500
Delaware
Fees
5000*
. Florida
Fees
5000
Georgia
800-2000
4000
Idaho
'5000
8000
Illinois
(23000 in Cook County)
(23000 in Cook County)
Kansas
600-4000
4000
·
Kentucky
Fees or reasonable .salary
' 3000
Maine
600-4000
7500
Maryland
4-15 per day
· 8500-11500
Massachusetts
3000-11000
1200,0-13000
Michigan
1000-8400
7000
Minnesota
7 50-7 500
6000
Mississippi
5000
5000
Missouri
Fees
2000-5 500*
Nebraska
800-4500
5000
New Hampshire
1500-2500
7000
New Jersey
4000-8000 (surrogate)
2700-15000
New Mexico ·
300-800
4500
New York
1800-15000
15000
Indicates that the compensation indicated may be supplemented locally.
861

*
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subject to noticeable differences, the amount paid to probate judges
being the lesser of the two. In the states where the unified court system prevails, there is identity of judges and consequently of salaries.
This applies also to the judges of the orphans' courts of Delaware, New Jersey and certain counties of Pennsylvania in which
the common pleas judges also preside over the orphans' courts. Only
in Pennsylvania do the judges of the orphans' courts ( where separate
from the common pleas c9urts) receive the same compensation_ as do
common pleas judges. Here the salary scale varies between •$9,000
and $14,000, depending upon the county.866 In New York City and
Chicago the salary of probate judges has been made to correspond to
that of trial judges.867
B. Other Personnel
As in courts of general jurisdiction, a clerk is a part of every probate
court organization. Invariably the duties of the clerk are "clerical,"
i.e., to keep the records of the court proceedings and to receive and
file petitions and other papers that are deposited in the court. In a
few states clerks are empowered to issue orders for hearings before the
Probate Judge
(23000 in N. Y. City)
Fees or salary
1500-2700
1100-10000
1500-5000
500-3000
9000-14000
Fees or salary
Fees or salary
700-3800
5 per day*
Fees or salary
600-2100

Trial Judge
(23000 in N. Y. City)
North Carolina
6500
North Dakota
4000
Ohio
3000*
Oklahoma
4000-7200
Oregon
5000-6500
Pennsylvania
9000-14000
Rhode Island
9500-10000
South Carolina
67 50
South Dakota
2500
Tennessee
5000
Texas
5000-7500*
Vermont
5000
Virginia
5400
West Virginia
2 per day
5000-7500*
Wisconsin
Fixed by county board
8000*
* Indicates that the compensation indicated may be supplemented locally.
The authors are advised that in Missouri the statutes providing for salaries of
probate judges in certain counties are regarded as unconstitutional; instead the fees of
office, up to the amount paid to circuit judges, are retained.
In Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Utah and
Wyoming, there is identity of judges for the tw.O courts and hence of their salaries.
866
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17, §§ 834, 836. It is not to be implied
from this statement that all r~ceive the same salary, but only that, county for county,
orphans' court judges receive the same as do common pleas judges in that county.
867
N. Y. Jud. Law, art. 5, §§ 142, 143; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c.
37, § 320; c. 53, § 22.
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court, appoint appraisers to make inventories, approve bonds, etc. Even
these are hardly more than ministerial duties. It is but another step
to empower the clerk to probate wills and grant letters in cases where
there is no dispute as to the validity of the will or any contest as to
who is entitled to letters. In most instances these are regarded as
routine functions which any- efficient and trustworthy clerk can perform.
They are the substantial equivalent -0f those performed by the registrars in the English ecclesiastical courts. Where statutes have invested
clerks of probate with powers of this kind, the judge is free to handle
the more important matters of probate administration.
A study of the various statutes reveals that clerks have been given
powers varying all the way from those of a clerical nature to complete
judicial powers corresponding to those possessed by the judge. Under
the recent Florida code the clerk may perform "all non-judicial functions which the judge may perform." 368 The Kansas code makes the
probate judge the clerk of the probate court and authorizes the appointment of assistants as deputy clerks.869 Statutes of every state either
provide for or contemplate the performance of clerical duties in keeping
the court records and files. Some authorize the clerk to issue notices or
citations for hearings before the court.870 Others provide for the approval or fixing the amount and approval of bonds of personal representatives,871 appointing appraisers for the inventory,372 supervising the
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 36.04.
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-202. Such a statute fixes
upon the probate judge the primary responsibility for keeping the records of the
probate court, but permits assistants to accomplish this objective. It also makes it
possible in a sparsely settled county for the judge to be his own clerk where the
amount of business does not warrant the employment of a deputy clerk.
370
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-2005; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §
1207; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4783; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 15-1505; Mass.
Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 217, § 21; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (12);
Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.095 (when authorized by court); Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) § 1248; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 10360,
10376; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 27-544; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§§ 2:31-37, 3:2-22; N. Y. Surrogates' Court Act, § 32; N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
-(Michie, 1943) § 2-16; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925) §§ 3306, 3333; Utah
Code Ann. (1943) §§ 102-2-1, 102-14-10; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.27 (in judge's
absence); Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-904.
371
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 300; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3813; Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-501; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § u832; Miss.
Code Ann. (1942) § 1249 (order new bonds); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson &
McFarland, 1935) § 10376 (in absence of judge from county, but subject to setting
aside or modification by judge within thirty days); Utah Code Ann. (1943) §
102-2-1; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § ,88-1503.
872
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 217, § 22; Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
368
869
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inventory,878 or making orders as to personal property.874 Of a slightly
higher order are powers to hear and pass upon claims against the
estate,m to make decrees barring creditors,876 to audit accounts,877 and
to grant discharges to personal representatives.878
Under the English system, as we have seen, there was a division
of function between the ecclesiastical courts and chancery in the ad.:.
ministration of decedents' estates. The power to probate wills and
grant letters, exercised by the ecclesiastical courts,819 was essentially
judicial in character even though no question was raised or contest
involved. :Vestiges of this dual organization exist in this country today
in Delaware, the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania where separate
offices of registers of wills are maintained, leaving the major task of
administering estates to the orphans' or probate court.880 Essentially
this same system prevails in Mississippi 881 and Virginia 882 where such
functions are performed by the clerk of the court instead of by a
register presiding over the separate register's court. In effect the register of wills or clerk has supplanted the ecclesiastical courts in performing this function. This practice of having a judicial function performed
by a ministerial officer is thus justified by history as well as by modern
§ 1248; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-2-1; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5249;
W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) § 4273.
·
37
.s Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3828-3842; N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:9.
874 Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § I 1832; N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943)
§§ 28-73 to 28-80; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-2-1 (perishable property).
875
D. C. Code (1940) § 19-403; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939 )art. 93, § 282;
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 1248; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland,
1935) § 10376 (in absence of judge and when not contested, but subject to setting
aside or modification by judge within thirty days).
876
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:25-9.
811 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 300; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3844; Iowa
Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 11832 (intermediate accounting); Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
c. 75, § 23; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 1249 (during vacation but subject to apploval
or disapproval by court}; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §
10376 (intermediate accounting, in absence of judge, but subject to setting aside or
modification by judge within thirty days); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§
2-16, 28-162; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 1861.
87 ~ N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-162; Del. Rev. Code (1935)
§ 3866.
879 See discussion under I-A supra.
880
See discussion under III-A-I supra. Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3799-3876;
D. C. Code (1940) § 19-403; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 1981. In
Pennsylvania, however, in case 0£ a contest, the register of wills may send, or the
orphans' court may order him to send, the matter to the latter court for hearing.
881
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 1248, 1249.
882 Va. Const., art. 6, § IOI; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5247, 5249.
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convenience. In the states above mentioned this power is lodged in the
register or clerk, whether or not there is a contest or dispute as to the
matter. Other states have been :willing to entrust this function to the
surrogate or clerk provided that no contest or dispute is involved.
This practice prevails in New Jersey,888 Alabama,88 Iowa 885 and North
Carolina,886 and the clerk of the superior court in North Carolina is ·
himself a court. 887 In Delaware the deputy register of wills may exercise this power in such circumstances,888 whereas the register may do
so irrespective of a contest.
In Maryland the register of wills exercises these prerogatives during vacation of the orphans' court.889 In .i\.rkansas,890 Indiana,891 Missouri 892 and West Virginia 898 the clerk proceeds similarly during
vacation, but subject to a subsequent confirmation or rejection by the
court. In Montana, during any absence of the judge, whether during
term time or not, the clerk possesses this power when there is no contest.894
In Mississippi 895 and Utah 898 the clerk may appoint special or
temporary administrators, and in North Carolina 897 may revoke letters
already granted. The register of wills in Pennsylvania 898 at any time,
and the clerk in Mississippi 899 during vacation subject to the subsequent
approval of the court, may do likewise:
This vesting in the clerk of judicial powers in probate does not stop
here. In Missouri the clerk may exercise almost complete judicial
power during vacation, subject to a subsequent confirmation or rejection
,i,

N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 3:2-22; 3:7-5.1.
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 13, § 300.
885
Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 11832.
888
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-30.
887
Edwards v. Cobb, 95 N. C. 4 (1886).
888
Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3803.
889
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, § 283.
890
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 4.
891
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-102.
892
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 1, 2440.
898
·
W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) §§ 4273, 4274.
894
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10376.
895
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 1248.
896
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-2-1.
897
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 2-16.
898
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 20, § 1863 (when granted to wrong person
or on probate of after-discovered will).
·
89
g Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 1249, 1251.
388

884
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by the court/00• In Alabama 401 and North Carolina m the clerk has
such power at all times in the absence of contest. This means that all
matters in these two states which are rioncontentious in fa.ct may be
supervised by the clerk. ~n Delaware the register of wills regularly
supervises the administration of decedents' estates except for the sale
of real estate.403 And in certain counties of South Carolina the judge
may confer complete judicial power upon the clerk.404
One further aspect of this lodgment of power in the clerk should
be mentioned. Where there is a vacancy in the office of judge provision
is m~de in New Mexico 405 and South Carolina 406 for the clerk to act
as judge pro tern during such vacancy. In one respect this practice
offends every principle previously advocated on the question of judicial
qualifications. As an emergency measure, it may be justified on the
basis that the clerk is the one person who is likely to be familiar with
the affairs of the court and would likely be capable of functioning
temporarily until a successor is selected and qualified.
Thus we witness all gradations of power lodged in some inferior
officer under a wide variety of circumstances. Each represents an attempt to facilitate the administration of the work of the probate court.
Some may seem to vest too much power in such officer. A critical
analysis should be accompanied by an examination as to how the system
works in a particular locality. The qualifications and abilities of the
clerk will be relevant in any individual case. Professor Atkinson points
out that even routine matters may be so seriously mishandled as to
cause serious consequences.407 The right of appeal or possibility of
correction by the judge is no more than a partial justification. A more
fundamental solution in connection with every grant or substitution of
power would be a requirement of higher qualifications on the part of the
officer who is invested with the power and who will act in the first
instance. Whether there· is a separate judge for each county, or but
one judge for several counties, the judge should assume the primary
responsibility for every judicial act. If the clerk is empowered to act,
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 2440 •
Ala. Code Ann. ( I 940) tit. 13, § 300.
402
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 2-16.
408
Del. Rev. Code ( I 940) cc. 98, 99·
4
11' S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 206.
405
N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 16-415.
406
S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 3642.
401 Atkinson, "Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Probate
Judges," 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 93 at 96 (1939).
400

.
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either in contentious or noncontentious matters, it seems desirable that
his acts should be subject to the subsequent approval or disapproval of
the judge.

VIII
STANDARDS FOR AN IDEAL PROBATE CouRT

By way of conclusion, we shall propose an answer to the question:
What are the standards for an ideal probate court? It is readily conceded that, in any legal study covering so vast an area, the conclusions
of the authors cannot be wholly objective. Necessarily, they are based,
not _only on the, legal and factual data heretofore presented, but also
on the individual background and experience of the respective writers.
Nevertheless, it is believed that each conclusion hereinafter presented
finds ample support in the materials discussed in the preceding pages.
The standards for an ideal probate court will be considered from
three standpoints: first, the ·place of the court in the' judicial organization; second, the subject matter of the jurisdiction of the court; and
third, the personnel of the court.
First, the probate court should be given a place in the judicial
organization fully coordinate with the trial court of general jurisdiction. Historically, that has been the course of development in England; and that is the trend in the United States. The nature of the
business of the probate court, the fact that it handles estates unlimited
in value and character, and that its jurisdiction may well include the
specific administration and distribution of both the real and the personal
property of the estate, all point to a conclusion that a superior court is
needed. If such a court is set up, then appeals with trial de novo in the
court of general jurisdiction would necessarily be ~liminated. The only
appeals would be to the appellate courts to which appeals are made in
actions at law and suits in equity.
Second, the probate court should be the same court as the court of
general jurisdiction or sho-qld be a division of it. This does not mean
merely a unification of judges, such, for example, as is the plan in
certain counties in Ohio and Pennsylvania. It means a unification of
courts. Indeed, this unification should be so complete that, if, after a
proceeding is begun, it is found to come under the equity or commonlaw jurisdictiqn of the court, it can be transferred to another docket of
the court or to another division, without beginning the proceeding
anew. Only in this way can be completely avoided the hardships incident
to determining where the shadowy, marginal line of probate jurisdic-
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tion is to be drawn. The question of whether a given matter should be
in equity or in probate will cease to be one in which a slight misstep on
the part of the attorney may prejudice an innocent litigant. Such a
judicial organization is advocated by Dean Roscoe Pound in his recent
book on Organization of Courts. In presenting the principles and outline for a modern court organization he suggests that there be three
chief branches, a court of appeal, a superior court and a county court
branch. Discussing the second of these, he says:408
"The second branch, the Superior Court, should be given
complete jurisdiction of first instance, civil and criminal, the civil
jurisdiction, for reasons set forth in preceding chapters, to include
law, equity, and probate. Certainly there should be no mandatory
setting off of these types of cases to separate divisions. But the
organization of this branch should be so :flexible that if experience
showed good reason for setting off some or all of them in that way,
it could be done by rule of court, or more Simply by assigning
cases to judges in such a way as to effect a practical segregation,
which, however, could be changed or revoked later if experience
or changed conditions made such action advisable."
This type of judicial organization can be adapted to operate both
in metropolitan areas and in rural districts. Without doubt, in large
cities there will be a number of judges selected for the trial courts of
general jurisdiction. Statutory provisions should set up some sort of
judicial council, or other administrative machinery, whereby these
judges can be assigned to particular speciali_zed matters. Just as some
may be assigned solely to criminal matters or to domestic relations
cases, so others should be assigned to the probate work of the court.
This is in fact done in certain metropolitan areas in California.409 But
the writers would advocate going even a step farther than does the
California system. In that state, the superior court, when it hears a
probate matter, is the "superior court sitting in probate." While it is
not another court, still its jurisdiction is so different that a proceeding
cannot ordinarily be transferred from its probate to its civil jurisdiction,
but would have to be started anew. The probate jurisdiction of the
trial courts in the state of Washington is to be preferred in this particular. In that state, as has been seen, there is not a court "sitting in
408

POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 28 l ( l 940).
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1941) §§ 67, 67a; Rules of Superior Court of
California (as amended to.July 1, 1943), rules 24 and 25, LARMAc, CoNSOLIDATED
INDEX TO CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, 1788-1791 (1943).
409
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probate." It is all a part of the same jurisdiction whether the subject
matter·be civil or probate.
In rural areas of sparse population objection may well be raised to
a separate judge of probate if he is to have the same qualifications and
salary as the judge of the trial court of general jurisdiction. It may be
felt that the small amount of probate business does not justify such
an expensive court. But when the probate jurisdiction is added to that
of the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the trial court, not only is this
objection eliminated, but the advantages of a unified court are· also
obtained.
1f the objection is made that in many states the unit for the trial
court is a district which may include several counties and that the
emergency character of some kinds of probate business may well require
a judge in each county, the answer is that the trial judge may be
assigned to a circuit which includes a number of counties; but clerks
may be elected or appointed in each county to take care· of routine business under the supervision of the judge, and, of course, the court can
sit in each county. 410 This is, in fact, the system adopted in Montana
and in some other states.
What should be included in the subject matter of-the jurisdiction
of the ideal probate court? Certainly if we have the unified court, then
this question becomes less important. If it is the same judge or a division
of the same court, it becomes much less important whether he is sitting
in equity or in probate as to the particular question before him. Nevertheless, in the interests of efficiency and simplicity of administration, it
would seem that all matters directly connected with the administration
of the decedent's e;tate should be within the probate division of1 the
court. Such has been the definite trend of legislation in the United
States even where probate courts are entirely separate from the trial
courts of general jurisdiction. And it is believed that that trend is
sound. In that particular the English judicial system might profit by
imitating some American models.
As to matters other than decedents' estates, it is clear that the
410 It may be added that, not only should there be a clerk in each county, but the
court should be open for business at all reasonable times. The tend~ncy of modem
legislation is to dispense with terms of court for probate qusiness. See Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2II: "There shall be no terms of the probate
court. It shall be open for the transaction of business at the county seat at all reasonable hours. Hearings may be had at such other places in the county as the ·court may
deem advisable."

.
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probate jurisdiction should include guardianships and matters closely
related, such as adoptions. But this jurisdiction should not be weighted
down with all sorts of irrelevant administrative matters, such as are
sometimes assigned to county courts which sit in probate matters.
Third, what can be said as to the personnel of the court? Obviously,
if the judge is a judicial officer of the trial court of general jurisdiction,
he should have, and will have, the same qualifications as that judge,
with a corresponding tenure and salary. But even if that were not the
case, the nature of probate jurisdiction calls for such qualifications. He
should be a member of the bar, preferably with experience in practice
or on the bench.
As to other officers of the court, such as clerks or registers, there
should be an adequate number of well qualified persons. Should they
have judicial powers? Considering the various patterns in the statutes
heretofore analyzed, we find three possible answers. First, in some
states such officers do have judicial powers; in other words, for some
purposes, they function as courts. Second, in other states, they have no
judicial powers whatever, but can perform only ministerial acts. In
still a third group of states, the clerk or register acts in certain matters
either subject to the subsequent approval of the judge or subject to
the lack of disapproval of the 3udge within a specified period.
It would seem that, if, as is herein advocated, a noncontentious,
summary procedure is permitted, efficiency would require that some
judicial powers be given to the clerk or register in these matters.
However, the judge should be held to strict accountability for these
acts. The jurisdiction described in the third group of states is believed
to be preferable. But it should be limited to noncontentious matters.
If the judge disapproves of the act of the clerk, or if the matter is
contentious, then it should come before the judge in person.
·
That these conclusions follow as a matter of course from the legal
and factual data herein presented can scarcely be denied. T4at they
have seldom been reached by legislative bodies in America is believed
to be due, not to the uncertainty of the conclusions, but to the fact
that, until very recently, the realm of probate law has been one outside the sphere of scholarly investigation or legislative reform."'11 And
11

A recent example of a scientific and comprehensive legislative approach to
probate reform is found in New Jersey. At its 1944 session the New Jersey legislature
agreed upon a revised constitution for that state which is to be submitted to the people
at the general election this year. The proposed constitution provides for a superior
court having complete general original jurisdiction in all cases, and divided into two
sections: (1) a law section to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction at law, and matri•
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this legal structure for more than a century has been added to or
amended, bit by bit, to accomplish the specific, narrow objectives of
particular legislators or of a few of their constituency, without any
consideration of the historical development or of the proper functions
of probate courts and probate legislation as a whole. If these pages
have contributed something toward a broad and comprehensive view
of the problems of probate court organization they will not have been
written in vain.
monial jurisdiction in certain cases; and (2) an equity and probat~ section to exercise
all other jurisdiction. Eurther provision is made that either section shall exercise the
jurisdiction of the other when the ends of justice so require. Proposed N. J. Rev.
Const. (1944) art. 5, § 3, pars. 2-3.

